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ABSTRACT 
The establishment of a New Zealand Republic has been described by 
some commentators as inevitable. They argue that New Zealand's quest for 
identity and nationhood will lead to the supplanting of the Sovereign with a 
President. Establishing a New Zealand Republic will raise a number of 
constitutional issues and this paper seeks to examine those issues which might 
result if New Zealand takes up the challenge. The paper is divided into two 
main parts; the first part identifies and evaluates whether there are any 
constitutional obstacles preventing New Zealand from becoming a republic 
and the second evaluates what role a President should play within New 
Zealand's constitution if a republic were to be formed. 
In regard to the possible constitutional obstacles this paper looks at 
whether the Crown is a fundamental postulate of our legal system and if that 
is so whether it is beyond the purview of Parliament. Maori concerns in 
regard to the establishment of a republic are examined, particularly their 
concern that such a change might annul the Treaty of Waitangi. There is 
little doubt that establishing a republic will require constitutional reform. 
The constitutional requirements for reform in New Zealand are discussed, in 
particular the judicial requirements to receive 'practical sanctity.' 
The second part of this paper examines what role a President should 
play within New Zealand's constitution focussing on the establishment of a 
New Zealand parliamentary republic, bearing in mind that the establishment 
of a presidential republic is beyond the scope of this paper. As a point of 
reference the present role of the Governor-General is outlined with 
particular focus on the reserve powers. In an attempt to determine what 
might be a suitable role for the New Zealand President this paper examines 
the process by which a president might be appointed and dismissed and 
furthermore what powers should be vested with the President. It also 
evaluates whether the President's reserve powers should be codified or 
divested to Parliament. 
Word count excluding footnotes and bibliography is 14,760. 
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THE PATH TO PRESIDENCY: NEW ZEALAND'S REPUBLICAN OPTIONS 
I INTRODUCTION 
In regard to New Zealand becoming a Republic, the Right Honourable 
Helen Clarke said: 
It's inevitable that New Zealand will become a republic and that would 
reflect the reality that New Zealand is a totally sovereign-independent 
21st century nation 12,000 miles from the United Kingdom.
1 
Such sentiments are supported by the Right Honourable Jim Bolger 
who said New Zealand will become a republic "because the tide of history 
was going in one direction"2 While it may be inevitable that ultimately New 
Zealand becomes a republic it has often appeared only as a distant 
possibility. However, recently, various institutions, which have symbolised 
New Zealand's inheritance as a former dominion of the British Empire, have 
been deposed. Institutions, such as the Privy Council and the British Honour 
system have all been replaced with New Zealand equivalents. There appears 
to be a developing impetus towards building indigenous institutions with an 
increasing momentum towards New Zealand becoming a republic. 
Whether it will occur in the near or distant future the transition from 
democratic monarchy to democratic republic will raise numerous 
constitutional issues. One will be whether it is possible for New Zealand to 
establish itself as a republic. The disposing of the Sovereign will be 
revolutionary and will rupture the legal continuity which has existed since 
the formation of New Zealand. The Crown has always been an implied 
constant within New Zealand's legal order and its displacement will raise 
many questions about the very nature of New Zealand's legal system. Does 
the Crown occupy a special innate position within our legal system? If this 
1Interview with the Right Honourable Helen Clark, Prime Minister (Today Programme, 
BBC Radio 4, 22 February 2002). 
2The Honourable Jim Bolger, Prime Minister, Parliament Debates 121 (8 March 1994). 
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is so does the Crown occupy an innate position which renders it beyond the 
reach of Parliament? 
The removal of the Crown, as a signatory to the Treaty of Waitangi 
raises numerous political and constitutional issues. Many Maori 
commentators believe that the deposing of the Crown will alter the status of 
the Treaty of Waitangi. As Maanu Paul states: "Republicanism would 
definitely affect the status of the Treaty. The constitutional basis of the 
Treaty would disappear."3 
Becoming a republic will not only be the disposing of the Crown but 
also the establishment of a president. If the position of president is to be 
established it is necessary to ascertain what the role of a New Zealand 
President should be. How should a president be appointed? Should the 
president's powers be purely ceremonial or should they be vested with 
considerable executive powers? 
The process of appointing a president is a contentious feature of any 
proposed presidential model. The process of how a president should be 
appointed was debated at length in the Australian republic referendum, with 
the general populace seeming to prefer an elected president 4 Some 
commentators have stressed the interrelationship between the process of a 
president's appointment and the powers vested within the position. 
Palmer and Palmer have expressed apprehension in the consideration 
of what powers a New Zealand President should be given. They have stated 
that "[we] should not simply replace the Queen with a President. The legal 
powers of that person would be awesome and unacceptable unless an 
exercise was done to define and confine the powers." 5 The president as 
Head of State will occupy an important role in New Zealand society. It is 
3 
Interview with Maanu Paul (Derek Fox, Mana News, National Radio,10 March 1994). 
4 
Mark McKenna and Wayne Hudson Australian Reader, (Melbourne University Press, 
Melbourne 2003)226. 
5
Geoffrey Palmer, and Mathew Palmer, Bridled Power, Oxford (4th ed, Australia, Oxford University Press 
2004) 65. 
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important, therefore, that such powers and responsibilities are considered 
carefully. 
This paper attempts to identify and clarify the constitutional issues 
which will arise from New Zealand becoming a republic. The potential 
constitutional obstacles to New Zealand becoming a republic are examined. 
It considers whether the Crown is a fundamental postulate of our legal 
system and if so, whether it is beyond the purview of the legislature It also 
examines Maori concerns relating to the establishment of a republic, 
particularly in regard to the Treaty of Waitangi. 
The establishment of a republic will require the reform of New 
Zealand' s constitution. New Zealand has no codified procedure for 
constitutional reform and commentators have argued that any such reforms 
must meet certain prerequisites to receive 'judicial legitimacy.'
6 
This paper evaluates what role a New Zealand President should have 
within our constitution. The position of president is evaluated including the 
process by which he or she should be appointed and dismissed. It also 
evaluates what powers should be vested within a New Zealand President. 
II SETTING THE SCENE 
A Establishing a New Zealand Republic 
A republic is defined as: "A system of government in which the 
people hold sovereign power and elect representatives who exercise that 
power."7 
6 Sir Robin Cooke, Detheridge Memorial Address reprinted in Council Brief 111 (October 
1984) 4. ["Detheridge Address"]. 
7 Brian A Garner(Ed) Black 's Law Dictionary (7th ed, West Group, St. Paul, 
Minnesota ,1999) 1306. 
5 
There is no standard republican constitution; instead there is a 
my1iad of different constitutional arrangements with varying forms of 
governments. Even though there are many varieties of republican 
constitutions, each one constitution can be placed within one of three 
categories .They are the Parliamentary Republic, the Presidential Republic 
and the Semi- Presidential Republic. 8 
Of these, the parliamentary republic is the most similar to New 
Zealand's Westminster system of government. A parliamentary government 
is described in Rod Hague & Martin Harrop's Comparative Government 
and Politics as having three main features: 
(l)The governing parties emerge from the assembly. Government 
ministers are usually drawn from, and remain members of, the 
legislature. 
(2) The head of the government (called prime minister, premier or 
chancellor) and the council of ministers can be dismissed from office 
through a vote of no confidence by parliament. 
(3) The executive is collegial, taking the form of a cabinet in which the 
prime minister is traditionally just first among equals. 9 
All of these features can be found within New Zealand's present 
constitutional arrangements. As the features of a parliamentary republic are 
already present in New Zealand's constitutional arrangements there is no 
need for substantial reform. The Australian Republican Advisory 
Committee's statement in reference to Australia is applicable to New 
Zealand: 
It is both legally and practically possible to achieve a republic without 
making changes which will in any way detract from the fundamental 
constitutional principles on which our system is based. The major issues 
are few how should the head of state be appointed (and removed if 
8 Rod Hague and Martin Harrop Comparative Government and Politics, An Introduction 
(6
th 
ed, Palgrave Macmillian ,Hampshire 2006) 268. 
9 
Hague and Harrop, above n8, 268. 
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necessary): what sort of powers and functions should the head of state 
have ?10 
In summary, becoming a Republic would not requtre substantial 
reform of our constitutional ainngements. However, as we shall soon see 
the establishment of the republic is often accompanied with considerable 
constitutional refo1m. 
B Constitutional Development and the Full Agenda Republic 
The transition from monarchy to republic will represent a rupture in 
New Zealand's legal continuity. Such breaks with legal continuity are 
generally accompanied with the establishment of what Andrew Ladley terms 
as a 'full agenda republic.' 11 As Philip Joseph states "[a] break in legal 
continuity inspires a political community to symbolise a new order in an 
identifiable and quotable constitutional document." 
12 
This break m 
continuity is usually perceived as an opportune time to construct a new 
constitution as an expression of nationhood. There are numerous examples 
of nations adopting a full agenda republic. Examples of these include the 
United States of America (1787), France (1789), Ireland (1936) and South 
Africa (1996). 
The construction of new legal order is fraught with difficulty. As 
John Stuart Mill wrote constitutions "are the work of men. Men did not 
wake up on a summer morning and find them sprung up"
13 
Drafting a new 
constitution is often a process of compromise and negotiation between 
opposing political interests. S Finer describes the formation of the American 
Constitution of 1787: 
10 The Report of the Republic Advisory Committee "An Australian Republic: The Options-The Report 
Volume 1" (l993) Commonwealth of Australia 10. ["RAC Report"] 
11 Andrew Ladley, "Who should be Head of State' in Colin James (ed) Building the 
Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 78, 78. 
12 Joseph See above Constitutional and Administration Law in New Zealand (2"
d
ed, Wellington, Brookers 
2004) 121 . ' 
13 Hague and Harrop, above n8 212. 
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lkers, 
The constitution was a thing of wrangles and compromises. In its complete 
state, it was a set of incongruous proposals cobbled together. And 
furthermore that is what many of its framers thought.
14 
In New Zealand many commentators believe that the establishment 
of a Republic is also a suitable time to construct a new constitutional 
document. Professor Jock Brookfield, of Auckland University said: "The 
constitution is broke and something has to be done about that. And the right 
time to do it is when we move from a Governor-General to a President."
15 
The adoption of a full agenda republic is contrary to New Zealand's 
approach of constitutional development which has been described as: "to fix 
things when they need fixing, without necessarily relating them to any grand 
philosophical scheme." 16 New Zealand's constitutional reform has generally 
refrained from idealism and constitutionalism which are exhibited in other 
countries. 
The establishment of a full agenda republic will meet with obstacles 
other than New Zealand's tendency towards pragmatism rather than 
constitutionalism. To establish a new legal order for New Zealand would 
require that some agreement is reached to the nature and content of this new 
constitution. It is also questionable whether a consensus could be achieved 
in regard to what a New Zealand constitution should contain. The "Building 
the Constitution" conference in 2000 was intended to crystallise the issues 
for constitution reform. The conference failed to reach any form of 
agreement. 17 The differences of opinion suggest that social and racial 
divisions are too deeply entrenched for the New Zealand people to reach any 
agreement on a new constitutional document. With such division of 
opinions in regard to the nature of a new constitution the possibility of full 
agenda republic appears slight. 
14 
Hague and Harrop, above n8 212. 
15The Republican Newsletter <www.republic.org.nz.> (Last accessed 19 August 2006) 
16Constitutional Arrangements Committee "Inquiry to Review New Zealand's Existing Constitutional 
Arrangements" (2006) AJHR 1.24A. 12. 
17 
Joseph above n 12, 128. 
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II OBSTACLES TO BECOMING A REPUBLIC 
New Zealand, in contrast to Australia, has an unwritten constitution 
and hence has no specified requirements for constitutional reform. In the 
absence of any statutory requirements for constitutional reform it would 
seem safe to assume that there would be no constitutional obstacles 
restricting New Zealand from becoming a republic. However, academic 
debate has focused predominantly on constitutional obstacles to New 
Zealand becoming a republic. It is questionable as to whether these 
obstacles are substantive or not 
A The Crown as a Fundamental Postulate of Our Constitution 
Lord Cooke, in his aiticle, The Suggested Revolution against the 
Crown, argues that deposing the Crown would be unconstitutional and 
illegal. 18 He postulates that any move to become a republic will be found to 
be illegal and would not be enforceable by the Judiciary (unless it could 
satisfy the conditions for political legitimacy). Lord Cooke 
19 
argues that 
there are various obstacles to New Zealand establishing itself as a republic. 
The foremost of these is that the Crown is a fundamental postulate of New 
Zealand' s legal system. The concept of fundamental postulates is an 
extension of common law rights theory. The common law rights theory 
postulates that there are rights which are so ingrained in common law that 
the legislature can not override them. Common law jurisprudence came to 
prominence with the decisions of Murphy J, serving in the High Court of 
Australia. In a number of cases Murphy J extrapolated from the Australian 
constitution an implied Bill of Rights which could invalidate legislation. 
These implied rights include freedom of speech, freedom from slavery and 
18 Sir Robin Cooke 'The Suggested Revolution Against the Crown ' in PA Joseph( ed) Essay 
on the Constitution (Bookers, Wellington,1995) 29 . 
19 Sir Robin Cooke above n 18 29 . This article includes three other arguments concerning 
why a republic is unconstitutional but these arguments are very technical in nature and for 
brevity have not been included. 
9 
freedom from arbitrary discrimination on the grounds of sex. The concept of 
common rights was established in New Zealand in the case of: Taylor v NZ 
Poultry, where Cooke J stated that: 
I do not think that literal compulsion, by torture for instance, would be 
within the lawful powers of Parliament. Some common law rights lie so 
deep that even Parliament could not override them. 
20 
Despite this judicial acknowledgment there is yet to be a case in New 
Zealand where statute has been declared invalid for breach of common law. 
As an extension of common law rights Lord Cooke (extra-judicially) 
developed the concept of fundamental postulates. The fundamental 
postulates of the constitution are principles which, if contravened by statute, 
would be invalidated by the Courts. There are three fundamental postulates 
of New Zealand's constitution: they consist of the operation of a democratic 
legislature, an independent judiciary and the existence of the Crown. Lord 
Cooke believed that throughout the development of common law the role of 
the Crown has been pivotal.21 The Crown exists as a fundamental postulate 
and that the abolishment of the Crown is beyond the purview of Parliament. 
Such legislation would only be rejected by the Judiciary.22 
It is however, questionable whether the Court will find that the 
Crown performs a fundamental function. The Crown does not perform a 
function in New Zealand's constitution which is comparable to the 
democratic legislature or an independent judiciary. The role of the 
Governor-General, while important, is simply not comparable to these 
institutions and it is certainly questionable whether it is at all fundamental. 
There has been much discussion recently between Parliament and the 
Judiciary in relation to the role of parliament supremacy. Michael Cullen has 
reasserted Parliament's authority to pass legislature unrestricted, stating that 
the: 
20 
Taylor v NZ Poultry Board [1984) l NZLR 394, 398, per Cooke J. 
21 
Sir Robin Cooke above nl8 31. 
22 
Sir Robin Cooke above nl8 33 . 
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"The sovereignty of Parliament is not an historical artefact, whic
h could be 
proved to be bogus . Unlike the sovereignty of a monarch ,
 it is not 
dependent upon estab li shing proof of lawful succession. It 
is Jess an 
'assumption' than an 'assertion '; but in that respect it is the ass
ertion that 
has been the major driving force of Western constitutional histor
y, namely 
that executive and legislative power should be exercised by a rep
resentative 
and democratically elected body, rather than a monarchy, aris
tocracy or 
even a meritocracy." 
23 
It would seem that doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament is s
till a 
vital part of our constitution. As such Parliament is free to enjoy
 unlimited 
powers of legislation, which would include the establishing 
of a New 
Zealand republic. 
It is disputed whether the Courts will recognise the Crown 
as a 
fundamental postulate of the common law. There have been 
numerous 
former British colonies which have made the transition from mo
narchy to 
republic, for example Ireland, South Africa, India, Mauritius and
 Pakistan. 
The Judiciary of these nations did not find that the abolishm
ent of the 
Crown was beyond the scope of Parliament. As there is no judicia
l authority 
that recognises the Crown as a fundamental postulate it is unlike
ly that the 
New Zealand Courts will find the establishment of a republic b
eyond the 
scope of the Legislature. 
B The Treaty and a New Zealand Republic 
Maori and the constitutional status of the Treaty of Waitangi ha
ve 
been described by Andrew Ladley as the rock by which a New
 Zealand 
republic will flounder upon.
24 Many Maori commentators have argued that 
if New Zealand became a republic it would be contrary to Maor
i interests 
and will affect the status of the Treaty of Waitangi. Andre
a Trunks 
23 Honourable Michael Cullen, Solicitor General, (Public Law Confe
rence: "Parliament: 
Supremacy over Fundamental Norms ,29 October 2004) 
24 Ladley above nl 1,82. 
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identified that Maori have two main concerns regarding a republican 
proposal. Firstly, Maori are concerned with the displacement of the Crown, 
due its significant symbolic and spiritual importance. Secondly, Maori are 
concerned that establishing a republic would diminish the constitutional 
status of the Treaty. 
J The Symbolic and Spiritual Importance of the Crown 
For Maori, the Treaty of Waitangi has great spiritual and symbolic 
significance. The Crown, as a signatory to the Treaty, also has significant 
symbolic and spiritual importance. Maori also believe that responsibility for 
the Treaty of Waitangi is ultimately vested with the Sovereign, the Queen.
25 
In regard to treaties, Ma01i custom stresses the ongoing facilitation of a 
relationship with the other party. 26 In accordance with protocol Maori 
attempted to facilitate relations with the Monarchy, particularly in relation to 
early breaches of the Treaty. Between 1882 and 1924 four Maori 
delegations were sent to the Sovereign to lay Maori complaints they had 
with the Settler Government, They attempted to appeal to the Monarch in 
regard to breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi. 27 These delegations were 
either turned away or informed that the Sovereign would not interfere on 
their behalf. Despite the Monarch's refusals there is still much affection for 
the Crown. Sir James Henare, a leading Maori elder, has said: 
It is a moot point whether the Maori people do love governments in 
New Zealand because of what they have done in the past .. . The Maori 
people really have no great love for Governments but they do for the 
Crown.
28 
25 Janine Hayward 'Who Should be Head of State' in Colin James(ed) Building the 
Constitution (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) 266,268. 
26 Andrea Trunks "Mana Tiriti" Luke Trainor: Republicanism in New Zealand (The 
Dunmore Press Ltd, Palmerston North, 1996) 113,115. 
27 
Trunks , above n26, 116. 
28 Affidavit of Sir James Henare (1 May 1987) referred to in the New Zealand Maori 
Council v Attorney General [ 1987] l NZLR 641 (CA). 
12 
The Maori belief that the British Sovereign was obligated under 
Treaty of Waitangi was due to cultural misperception. As the Privy Council 
has ruled in Ne,v Zealand Maori Case Council v Attorney General the 
"obligations of her Majesty, the Queen of England under the Treaty are now 
those of the Crown in right of New Zealand."
29 The Treaty obligations have 
always rested with the New Zealand Government and not the Sovereign. 
Janine Hayward argues that if the Sovereign is to be replaced then it 
should be replaced with an institution that caters to Maori original 
perceptions of the Crown. 
30 She suggests that a new Head of State should 
be an individual or an institution which; "replaces the layer of accountability 
as miginally envisaged in the Treaty. 
31
" She suggests that the model 
proposed by the New Zealand Maori Council should be adopted, with the 
Head of State being a quasi-judicial body, consisting of two former 
Governor-Generals, who would administer the Treaty of Waitangi 
settlements. 32 The establishment of the Head of State as a quasi-judicial 
body would most likely politicise the position making the Head of State 
unsuitable to fulfil many of the presidential functions. It would seem more 
appropriate to establish a separate body for arbitration of the Treaty of 
Wai tangi settlements. 
Maori reverence for the Crown though maybe in decline. Shane 
Jones, Labour MP, has said: "The priority for many Maori is dealing first 
with Treaty grievances, but younger Maori are increasingly likely to value 
their identity as both Maori and as citizens of an independent Pacific 
nation.33" He suggests that Maori reverence for the Crown will fade and 
with it the concerns of becoming a republic. There is some evidence that this 
has already begun to occur. In 1999 the only poll to have compared Maori 
and Pakeha suppott for a republic showed 63% support from Mami, 
29 New Zealand Maori Case Council v Attorney General [1994] NZLR 513,517. 
30 Hayward, above n25 265 . 
31 Hayward, above n25264. 
32 Hayward ,above n 25 264. 
33 Jonathan Milne "The People vs. the Crown" (30 May 2004) Sunday Star Times, 
Wellington 18. 
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considerably more than the 38% recorded for Pakeha. 34 It could be argued 
that the Maori concerns relating to the spiritual status of the Crown have 
been overstated and Maori are less concerned with the disposing of the 
Crown than Pakeha. As Andrea Tunks states:" only a small proportion of 
Maori are sentimental about the relationship with The Queen ... Most though 
are concerned with the enforcement of the Maori Treaty text. .. "35 
2 Establishing a Republic and its Effect on the Status of the Treaty 
The predominate concern of Maori about New Zealand becoming a 
republic is the possible effects it might have on the legal status of the Treaty. 
Many Maori are distrustful of New Zealand Government intentions, and 
perceive that the removal of the co-signatory of the Treaty of Waitangi 
would result in the annulment of the Treaty. Maanua Paul confirms this fear 
when she states: 
Republicanism would definitely affect the status of the Treaty. The 
constitutional basis of the treaty would disappear. On that basis it would 
endanger. .. [the Government's] accountability to Maori. 
36 
The fear that the Treaty of Waitangi could be annulled by New 
Zealand becoming a republic is not valid. The Treaty of Waitangi is an 
international instrument and as such is governed by international law. 
International Law has a recognised principle of continuity which holds that 
despite any change in the form of government all international obligations 
remain. As Judge William H Taft in the Costa Rica Arbitration states: 
Changes in the government or the international policy of a state do not as a 
rule affect its position in international law. A monarchy may be transformed 
into a republic or a republic into a monarchy: absolute principles may be 
34 
Jonathan Milne above n33 18. 
35 
Trunks, above n23 116. 
36 
Maanu Paul n3. 
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substituted for constitutional or the reverse: but though the government 
changes the nation remains with rights and obligations unimpaired.
37 
Maori Lawyer, Moanna Jackson has acknowledged this: 
The precedent is now established that the effective to the Treaty is actually 
Kawanantanga or government. So whether that government takes the form 
of a constitutional monarchy is, in my view, irrelevant. They are still bound 
by the terms of the agreement in 1840.
38 
Maori reservations in regard to the Treaty of Waitangi and New Zealand 
becoming a republic a.re without foundation. The establishment of a 
Republic will not alter the legal status of New Zealand' s founding document. 
Whilst acknowledging that the status of the Treaty of Waitangi 
would not be affected by New Zealand becoming a republic many Maori 
commentators see the inception of a New Zealand Republic as a suitable 
time to fully entrench the Treaty of Waitangi. Professor Jock Brookfield, of 
Auckland University, said that in regard to Treaty matters, "the constitution 
is broke, and something has to be done about that. And the right time to do it 
is when we move from a Governor-General to a President."
39 
Many Maori 
perceive the disposing of the Crown, as a suitable to time to entrench the 
Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand. This would be an indication that Maori 
are pursuing the full republic model in which the Treaty of Waitangi is 
entrenched in statute. However, there is nothing about becoming a republic 
that requires an accompanying entrenchment of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
37Mark W . Janis, John E. Noyes. International Law Cases and Commentary: Digest of International 
Law (West Publishing Company St Paul , Minnesota 1997) 249. 
38Interview with Moanna Jackson, (Derrick Fox, Mana News, Radio New Zealand , 10 
March 1994). 
39 The Republican Newsletter (May 2000)/ <www.republic.org.nz.> (Last accessed 19 
August 2006) 
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?nal 
C The Requirements for Constitutional Reform and a New Zealand 
Republic 
Predominately, most nations have a codified constitution that 
specifies the procedural requirements which have to be met for any 
constitutional reform. In Australia, any reform of the constitution must be 
sanctioned by a national referendum with the majority of four out of the five 
states in support 
40 
Sweden requires that any amendment to the constitution 
must be passed by successive governments two terms apart.41 New Zealand, 
unlike other nations, has an "unwritten' constitution and so has no 
prescribed procedure for constitutional reform. The Constitution 
Arrangements Committee described it as such: "There is minimal legal 
prescription for the way constitutional change occurs in New Zealand."42 
In the absence of any statute, it has been proposed that the Judiciary 
will only uphold constitutional reform if it meets certain requirements. Lord 
Cooke in his, Detheridge Memorial Address, dismissed "legal logic" as 
being all that was necessary for judicial acceptance. He postulated that with 
any fundamental constitutional change the Court must ascertain the will of 
the people to receive judicial acceptance.43 For the constitutional reform to 
receive 'practical sanctity' the statute must be: "Supported by either a 
referendum or a fully representative constitutional conference or a virtually 
unanimous vote in the House."44 In the White Paper, A Bill of Rights for 
New Zealand the Government acknowledged that concept of 'practical 
sanctity.' 45 Therefore, any constitutional reform to be upheld by the 
judiciary will have to meet the above requirements. 
However, F Brookfield has argued that in establishing a New 
Zealand republic there are further prerequisites to receive practical sanctity. 
4° Commonwealth Constitution of Australia Act 1901, Section 128. 
41 
Art 16, Sweden Constitution 1976. 
42 C · · C . b 6 onst1tut1onal Arrangements omm1ttee a ove n . 
43 
Detheridge Address, above n6 4. 
44 
Detheridge Address, above n6 4. 
45 
Ministry of Justice "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper" (1985) 57. 
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Instead, he insists, there must be two separate referendums, one for Maori 
and one for Pakeha. Maori, he believes, have a special right of consultation 
in regard to the disposing of the Crown due to the symbolic importance of 
being a signatory to the Treaty of Waitangi. Lord Cooke in support of this 
maintains that: 
Whatever the precise legal , sufficient Maori concurrence, the yielding of 
Kawanatanga was to the Queen. As has been seen, sufficient Maori 
Concurrence was treated by her United Kingdom advisers as essential to the 
annexation of New Zealand. As a matter of elementary fairness , good faith , 
and national honour, it is hard to see how we could cut our links without a 
similar occurrence.46 
As earlier discussed the legal status of the Treaty of Waitangi will be 
unaffected if New Zealand becomes a republic. It will not rescind or lessen 
the constitutional status of the Treaty and because the Treaty rights will be 
unaffected by the change there seems to be no moral reason for Ma01i to be 
granted a special voting privilege. 
Brookfield argues for parallel referendums as a matter of fairness 
and not as an obligation under the Treaty. Neve1theless the Treaty of 
Waitangi sets out a principled approach for considering Maori interests. In 
regard to the Treaty of Waitangi the Court of Appeal has held that the 
Government is obligated to consult with Maori.47 The Court has also held 
that there are limits to this right of consultation. The Waitangi Tribunal, in 
considering Ma01i Land, has stated that the Crown is not required "in 
protecting Maori citizenship rights to political representation, to go beyond 
taking such action which is reasonable in the circumstances" 48 Having a 
separate Maori referendum would be essentially anti-democratic, in that it 
would give preference to a minority of Maori voters over the general 
46Cooke, above n 11, 34 
47 New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney-General [1987) 1 NZLR 641,663 per Cooke P, 
"The Lands Case.". 
48 Waitangi Tribunal (Wai 413):,Report Maori Electoral Option Report 7 (Brookers 
Wellington ,1994) 3.8. 
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populace. Certainly such anti-democratic actions would deem to be beyond 
the limits of reasonableness and consequently there is no duty of 
consultation. 
The pre-eminent international treaty on civil rights, of which New Zealand 
is a party, is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
International Civil and Political Right Treaty,Article 25 provides: 
"Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the 
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote 
and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will 
of the electors; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his 
country. 49 
This Article guarantees a right to very citizen to have access to 
public affairs. In the application of this Article the Human Rights 
Committee in ruled in Marshall (Mikmaq Tribal Society) v. Canada that a 
referendum was included with this right to 'public affairs' and as such could 
not discriminate in regard to sex, race and religion.50 
Separate referendums for Maori and Pakeha would be in breach of 
New Zealand's international obligations. A referendum which politically 
privileged Maori would be incredibly divisive. The separate referendum for 
Maori and Pakeha can not be justified as it is beyond the rights guaranteed 
within the Treaty of Waitangi and would arguably be contrary to the ICCPR. 
The 1986 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform proposed that a 
referendum should be held on any major constitutional issue. As a 
referendum involves the general public in the drafting of the Constitution it 
49
International Covenant on Civil and Political Right Treaty (19 December 1966) 99 UNTS 
171. art 25. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Right Treaty, Art. 25. 
50 
Marshall (Mikmaq Tribal Society) v. Canada, Human Rights Committee ( No. 205/1986, 
CCPR/C/43/D/205/ 1986.) 
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would suggest that in a political and legal sense a referendum would be the 
most suitable means of determining a Head of State. It is also suitably 
symbolic when conside1ing the symbolism of the President as New 
Zealand ' s Head of State and that the public should be involved in defining 
its role. There seems to be legal and political consensus that whether New 
Zealand becomes a republic or not it should be determined by referendum 
In summary there are no constitutional obstacles which prevent New 
Zealand from becoming a republic. The Crown is not an innate part of New 
Zealand' s legal order. Maori will not suffer any loss of Treaty tights if New 
Zealand becomes a Republic. However, establishing a republic must meet 
the requirements of practical sanctity. A single referendum would be 
sufficient to meet the requirements of practical sanctity and also fulfil the 
goal advanced by the Constitutional Arrangements Committee of 
stimulating constitutional debate among the public. Parallel referendums for 
Maori and Pakeha cannot be justified as the referendum would be contrary 
to both the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and New Zealand's 
international obligations. Instead a single referendum is all that is necessary 
to establish a New Zealand republic. 
IV THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL 
With the adoption of a Parliamentary Republic, the New Zealand 
parliamentary system of government would continue principally unchanged. 
The role of a New Zealand President in a parliamentary republic would be 
equivalent to that of the Governor-General. The role of the President would 
have to fulfil similar ceremonial, community and constitutional functions as 
the Governor-General. Therefore, in seeking to define the role of future New 
Zealand Presidents it would be prudent to examine the role of the Governor-
General. 
While the Office of Governor-General is established by the Letters 
Patent 1983, it is the Constitution Act 1986 which defined the role and 
19 
powers of the Governor-General. Section 2 of the Constitution Act 1986 
provides that: 
( I )The Sovereign in right of New Zealand is the Head of State of 
New Zealand, and shall be known by the royal style and titles 
proclaimed from time to time. 
(2)The Governor-General appointed by the Sovereign is the 
sovereign representative in New Zealand. 51 
This statue further stipulates that the Governor-General exercises the 
royal powers on behalf of the Sovereign. The Governor-General is a 
member of the Executive Council, a body which is shared with other 
members of Parliament. The Executive Council carries out various functions 
the essential function being to ensure that the Governor-General has access 
to ongoing ministerial advice. 52 
A: Appointment and Recall of the Governor-General 
The appointment process for the office of Governor-General is of 
great importance. The position requires that the Governor-General be 
neutral and above party politics in order to effectively discharge his or her 
functions. The non partisan nature of the office has been particularly 
emphasised since the advent of Mixed Member Proportional (MMP). As 
Philip Joseph states that "under MMP, the political detachment and 
neutrality of the office is a constitutional imperative."53 
The Governor-General is appointed by the Queen on the advice of 
the Government. 54 The appointment is for the duration of five years. The 
opposition is generally consulted as to who the Governor-General should be. 
Such consultation is to ensure that the Governor-General has widespread 
and non-partisan support. Those persons appointed as Governor-General are 
51 
The Constitutional Act 1986, s2 (2) . 
52 
Palmer and Palmer, above n 5,53 . 
53 
Joseph, above n 12 694. 
54 
Palmer and Palmer, above n 5, 53. 
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typically former members of the judiciary and are not tied to any political 
party. In spite of the usual practice of consultation there have, in the past, 
been partisan appointments. Examples of these include Sir Keith Holyoake, 
Sir Paul Reeves and Dame Catherine Tizard.
55 
Some commentators have questioned whether the present process of 
appointment is sufficient to prevent partisan appointments. They believe that 
a Government should not be able to appoint a Governor-General without full 
consultation. The right honourable Jim Bolger has acknowledged this 
concern stating that: "Given the importance of such decisions the public at 
large will want to feel comfortable that the decision made by the head of 
state is above partisan." 56 To ensure a non-pmtisan appointment 
commentators have proposed a more formal process of a parliamentary vote. 
The Governor-General can be recalled (dismissed) as easily as he 
or she was appointed. As stated by Sir Michael Hardie Boys: "Just as I was 
appointed by Her Majesty on the advice of the Prime Minister, so can I be 
recalled on his advice. My fate can be decided by a telephone call."57 The 
Prime Minister can simply request the Governor-General be recalled 
effectively resulting in dismissal. The removal of the Governor-General by 
Prime Minster fiat has been criticised as creating a 'high noon scenario.' 
This is where the Prime Minister or Governor-General is forced to take a 
pre-emptive strike to remove the other for fear of him or herself being 
disposed. Such a scenario forces the Governor-General to hastily exercise 
his or her reserve powers. 
The dismissal of the Australian Prime Minister Whitlam is an example of a high-noon 
scenario. 58 The former Governor-General, Sir John Kerr ' s dismissal of Prime Minister 
Whitlam is the only time a reserve power has been exercised in Australia ' s history. The 
Australian Parliament consists of two houses - The House of Representatives and The 
55 Joseph, above n 12, 694. 
56 
Andrew P. Stockley "Becoming a Republic? Issues of Law" in Luke Trainor (ed): Republicanism in 
New Zealand (The Dunmore Press Ltd, Palmerston North, 1996) 81 , 95 . 
57 Sir Michael Hardie Boys, Governor "General Public Law Class" (General Public Law 
College House, Christchurch, 10 September 1997). 
58 Stockley, above n56, 95. 
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ism in 
Senate. In 1974 the Whitlam Labour government was returned to office, but 
soon after the Liberal party gained control of the Senate. The following year, 
the liberal leader, Malcolm Fraser announced that the Senate would refuse 
supply due to the reprehensible activities of certain government ministers. 
(Several ministers had reportedly received loans from unknown Middle East 
Sources.).59 
Frazer demanded dissolution of both houses and new elections, 
Whitlam refused. The Governor-General John Kerr, concerned for the 
finances of Government, approached the Chief Justice, Sir Garfield Barwick. 
Sir Garfield Barwick, advised that a Prime Minister who was unable to 
secure supply should be dismissed. Kerr dismissed Whitlam two weeks 
before supply would have lapsed 60 Andrew Stockley contends that it was the 
growing suspicion between the Governor-General and Prime Minister that 
led John Kerr to dismiss the Prime Minster two weeks before federal finance 
had expired.61 
To avoid such a high-noon scenario such as this, commentators have 
proposed that the Prime Minister's power of recall be reformed and replaced 
with a more formal process for dismissal.62 
B The Role of the Governor-General 
The Governor-General ' s role consists of three functions, the 
ceremonial, the community and the constitutional. 
63 
1 Ceremony 
59 Several ministers had reportedly received loans from unknown Middle East Sources. 
60 
Joseph above nl2, 267 . 
61 S tockley, above n 56 ,95 . 
6' - Joseph, above n 12 ,696. 
63 Governor-General ' s Website< http://www.gov-gen.govt.nz/role/functions.htm> (last 
accessed 28 August 2006). 
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The Governor-General as Head of State has many ceremonial duties. 
They include officiating at the opening of Parliament, welcoming diplomats, 
holding honorary ceremonies and greeting Heads of State.
64 
The Governor-
General is also the Commander Chief of the Armed Forces, although this is 
ceremonial position and does not actually instruct the armed forces. 
2 Community 
The Governor-General 1s to expected to provide non-partisan 
leadership in the community.65Dame Silvia Cartwright has written that the 
goal of the Governor-General is "to reflect their national values and identity 
and to work as a unifying mechanism ... "
66 
3 Constitution.a/ism 
The Governor-General's powers include a vast array of 
constitutional functions, which stem from a mixture of statute and 
convention. Such constitutional functions include formally appointing and 
dismissing prime ministers, dissolving and proroguing Parliament, assenting 
to bills and formally appointing and dismissing Court of Appeal and High 
Court Judges. 67 These constitutional functions are, however, regulated by 
the cardinal convention that the Governor-General must only exercise them 
on ministerial advice. 68 The convention, as stated by Viscount Esher, an 
adviser to George V, said: 
If the sovereign believes advice to him to be wrong, he may refuse to take 
it, and if his Minister yields, the Sovereign is justified. If the Minister 
persists ... a constitutional Sovereign must give way
69 
64Governor-General 's Website above n5 l. 
65Governor-General's Website above n51. 
66Dame Silvia Cartwright, Governor-General ,"The Role of the Governor-General", (New 
Zealand Centre for Public Law, Occasional Paper No 6, Wellington, October 2001). 
67 Palmer and Palmer above n 5 55. 
68 Joseph above n 13 659. 
69 Cited in George Winterton Parliament the Executive and the Governor General- A 
Constituitonal Analysis (Melbourne University, Melbourne, 1986) 156. 
23 
Even though the constitutional powers of the Governor-General 
appear vast and significant they are in fact greatly constrained. The 
Executive Council is the body through which the Governor-General receives 
Ministerial advice. The 1983 New Zealand Letters Patent explicitly states 
that "Our Ministers of the Crown shall keep Our Governor-General fully 
informed concerning the general conduct of the Government of Our said 
R 1 
,,70 earn. 
D The Reserve Powers 
There are instances when the Governor-General can exercise 
discretionary powers. These discretionary powers are referred to as the 
reserve powers. Their name is a misnomer because the reserve powers are 
actually not powers at all but are exceptions where the Governor-General is 
not bound to act on ministerial advice. The instances giving rise to the 
exercise of the reserve powers are rare, arising only when there is a great 
political impasse which threatens the process of government. 71 In 
Commonwealth countries, the reserve powers have been used only five 
times in the last century, in Canada (1926) Pakistan (1955) Australia (1975) 
Grenada (1983) and in Fiji (1987). 72 The reserve powers although rarely 
used are considerable and their exercise is typically divisive. In regard to the 
exercise of the reserve powers Professor Quentin Baxter states "[t]he 
political fact is that the use of these draconian measures causes the 
constitution to shudder and may set in train evolutionary or revolutionary 
forces." 73 
As conventions, the reserve powers are defined by "precedence" and 
"generally accepted political practice." 74 The conventions of the reserve 
powers are broadly stated and have not been defined by precedence. As R Q 
Quentin Baxter elegantly states: "In the true tradition of an "unwritten 
70 Latter Patent Constitutino the Office of the Governor-General of New Zealand, at XV 1. 
7 1 o 
Jospeh above n 13 659. 
72 
Jospeh above n 13 659. 
73 R.Q. Quentin-Baxter May "The Governor-General's Constitutional Discretions: An Essay 
Toward a Re-definition."(VUWLR 1980) 10 289, 309. 
74 J P Mackintosh The British Cabinet (3 rd ed, Stevens, London, 1977)13. 
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constitution, it has been the B1itish instinct to leave the rules at large, lest 
they become too cut-and-dry, or too foreshortened, to fulfil their high 
purpose."75 The nature of what constitutes the reserve powers has been the 
subject of considerable debate. Whilst areas of substantial vagueness and 
uncertainty still exist there are, however, four generally accepted reserve 
powers. These are to appoint a prime minister, to dismiss a prime minister, 
to refuse to dissolve Parliament and, in certain circumstances, to force 
dissolution of Parliament.76 
1 Appointment of the Prime Minister 
The Governor-General's appointment of Prime Minister 1s 
determined by convention which does not "import a broad discretion." The 
convention is set out in the Cabinet Office Manual 2001 as: "Convention 
dictates that the Leader of the party or group of parties with the support of 
the House is chosen as Prime Minister."77 
During the First Past the Post (FPP) system an election always 
resulted in a majority party who naturally had the support of the house. The 
introduction of Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) means it is rare that a 
single party will have a majority. Instead, parties have to enter into a 
coalition to form a government. It is more likely that the Governor-General 
will have to exercise personal discretion to determine who will be appointed 
Prime Minister. Sir Michael Hardie Boys, seeking to clarify the position of 
the Governor-General offered a general statement of principle. 
The formation of a government is a political decision and must be 
arrived at by politicians. My task as Governor-General is to ascertain 
where the support of the House lies . In an unclear situation that may 
require me to communicate with the leaders of all the parties 
represented in the new Parliament. 
75 Quentin-Baxter May, above n 72+ 297. 
76 Palmer and Palmer n5 , 57. 
77 Cabinet Manual 2001 ( Wellington, 2001) para 4.10 
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Once political parties have reached an adequate accommodation, and a 
government is able to be formed or confirmed. I expect that the parties 
will make that clear to me by appropriate public announcements of 
their intentions.78 
The Governor-General will only exercise independent judgement in 
determining where support of the House lies when the debate between the 
political parties has been exhausted. 
2 Dismissal of Prime Minister 
The dismissal of a Prime Minister is a considerable power and its 
exercise has always been contentious and divisive. It is often perceived as a 
recourse of last resort, an ultimate weapon which is liable to destroy its user. 
There are, however, two accepted grounds for a Governor-General to 
dismiss a Prime Minister, these are when a Prime Minster has lost 
confidence or when the Government or prime minister is persisting in illegal 
or unconstitutional conduct.79 
There are a variety of ways in which a Prime Minister can lose 
confidence. They include the Government losing a confidence vote in the 
House, when the Prime Minister is replaced as party leader and when a 
coalition Government nominates another paity leader.80 
In accordance with these conventions any Prime Minister who has lost 
confidence must resign. If the Prime Minister does not resign the Governor-
General is entitled to dismiss him or her. This dismissal should only occur 
when the Governor-General has frustrated all avenues to induce the Prime 
Minister to act in accordance with convention. 
78 
Hardie Boys, Governor General "Harkness Henry Lecture: Continuity and 
Change"(Wellington, 31 July 1997). 
79
The Report of the Republic Advisory Committee, An Australian Republic The Options- The 
Appendages Volume 2 (1993) Commonwealth of Australia. ["RAC Appendages"] 
80 
Joseph above nl2 670. 
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The more contentious ground for dismissing a Prime Minister 1s 
illegality. An implied role of the Governor-General is to act as a 
constitutional guardian.81 As described by F. Forsey: 
[T]he reserve powers, under our Constitution, are an absolutely essential 
safeguard of democracy. It takes the place of the legal and judicial safeguards 
provided in the United States by written constitutions, enforceable in the 
courts .82 
The Governor-General acts as a 'constitutional guardian' dismissing 
the Prime Minster or Government for persisting in illegal or unconstitutional 
conduct. These grounds for dismissing a Prime Minister are considerably 
broad and ambiguous; it is unclear as to what constitutes a breach of the 
constitution sufficient to dismiss a government. Prolonging the life of 
Parliament and obtaining a general election by fraud are obvious examples 
of a fundamental breach of the constitution. 
The Governor-General , acting as a constitutional guardian, must still 
persist and attempt to convince the Prime Minister to desist with his or her 
illegal behaviour before he or she is dismissed.
83 The dismissal of a Prime 
Minister for unconstitutional actions must only be a recourse of last resort, 
when all other possibilities have been exhausted. In the role of constitutional 
guardian the Governor-General must not interfere or pre-empt the Courts by 
pre-determining illegality. This issue of pre-empting the Courts was raised 
in the dismissal of the New South Wales Premier, Mr Lang. The State 
Government of New South Wales was facing financial ruin and in an 
attempt to evade making repayments to the Federal Government it directed 
its officers to act contrary to the Federal regulation. The Governor, Sir 
Phillip Game, drew this breach of law to the attention of the Premier but he 
refused to retract the orders and was promptly dismissed. The actual 
illegality of the actions though was never determined prior to the Premier 
81 Joseph above n 12 678. 
82 Evatt Forsey Freedom and Order( , McClelland and Steward, Toronto, 1974), 46. 
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being dismissed. Commentators believe that Governor-General can not pre-
empt the Courts. Instead, the illegality must be determined by the Judiciary. 
Despite these conventions the Governor-General's powers to dismiss 
the Prime Minister (and Parliament) for a fundamental breach of the 
constitution are broad and ill-defined and give cause for concern. This 1s 
pa11icularly so if such a broad power is to be transferred to a President. 
3 Refusal of a Request of Dissolution 
The Prime Minister may request a dissolution of the House but the 
Governor-General may refuse to grant an early dissolution of Parliament. 
Such a reserve power was acknowledged by the Right Honourable Jim 
Bolger: 
[S]ome believe that would enable me to ask the Governor-General 
for her consent to call a general election. I could ask, but that 
consent may or may not be given. She could judge it appropriate to 
call on the leader of the next largest party Labour to see whether it 
was able to form a government." 84 
The Governor-General may believe that, following a Prime Minister's 
request, it is in the best interests of the nation to not dissolve Parliament. 
This is usually because the Governor-General believes a general election 
could be averted the formation of new coalition forming and becoming 
Government. The Canadian Governor-General, Lord Byng, refused to grant 
a resolution mistakenly believing that the opposition parties could form a 
government. Sir Ivor Jennings says: "A sovereign who thought that the 
power of dissolution was being put to serious abuse could refuse to allow a 
dissolution."85 There are particular circumstances when it is appropriate for 
the Governor-General to refuse a request for dissolution. These exist 
(1). where a coalition party transfers its allegiance to the opposition giving it 
a majority 
84 
Stockley, above n56, 95. 
85 
Sir Ivor Jennings ,The British Constitution (4th Edition, Cambridge, 1961),114. 
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(2) when a Prime Minster is replaced as a party leader in a coalition or 
min01ity government that still has the confidence of the House. 
(3) when a Prime Minister who is defeated at the elections does not resign 
but instead requests dissolution and 
(4) when an election provides no clear result and the Prime Minister 
requests fresh elections without summoning Parliament and testing where 
the confidence of the House lies.
86 
5 Dissolution of Parliament 
The grounds for which a Governor-General can dismiss a 
Government is when it persists in illegal or unconstitutional conduct. The 
grounds of unconstitutional conduct are identical to those already discussed 
above for dismissal of a Prime Minister. 
D REFORM OF THE RESERVE POWERS 
Robert Quentin Baxter in his paper, The Governor-General's 
Constitutional Discretions: An Essay toward a Re-definition, argues that the 
reserve powers are presently too vague and ambiguous and in desperate 
need of further definition. The advent of MMP has further increased the 
need for reform of the reserve powers. Caroline Morris in her essay The 
Governor-General, The Reserve Powers, Parliament and MMP: A New Era 
states: 
If the Governor-General is required to exercise reserve powers more often, 
it is vital that they be credible and effective. Credibility can only be 
effectiveness can only come; it has been submitted, by the powers being 
exercised according to clear guidelines, soundly based in principle. These 
principles are those of Crown neutrality and democracy 87 
86 Joseph above nl2, 674. 
87 Caroline Morris "The Governor-General, The Reserve Powers, Parliament and MMP: a new era." 
(1995) 25 VUWLR 345, 37 I. 
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new era." 
Dr. H Evatt has advocated codification of the reserve powers, 
believing that a written code will clarify and define them. He states that 
codifying the conventions would be difficult and would lose flexibility but 
believed that there is a "greater danger in leaving things how they are."88 
The attempts at further defining and the clarifying the reserve powers 
through codification has proved problematic. Because the reserve powers 
are ambiguous and intricate the codification of the conventions has resulted 
in rigid and overly complex definitions. The question of whether the reserve 
powers should be codified is still contested. 
As the President will expect to inherit these reserve powers the 
establishment of a New Zealand republic will require the review and 
possible reform of them. As Professor George Winterton states: 
The advent of a republic, which necessitates a re-examination of the role of the head 
of state in our constitutional system, is obviously an opportune occasion for 
reconsidering what, if any, reserve powers ought to have, and how such powers 
should be defined. 
89 
Ill APPOINTING A NEW ZEALAND PRESIDENT 
The fundamental issue in establishing a New Zealand republic is to 
determine what role a President should play within New Zealand's 
constitution. The establishment of a parliamentary republic will not 
substantially alter the system of Government and the role of the President 
will, in many ways, be similar to that of the Governor-General. The role of 
the President, like the Governor-General, will consist of similar duties 
88 H Evatt, The King and His Dominion Governors (Frank Cass, London, 1967)120. 
89 
George Winterton "Reserve Powers in an Australian Republic" (1993) 12 Uni 
Tas LR. 249,253. 
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including ceremonial, community and constitutional functions. To 
effectively discharge his or her duties the President must appear impartial 
and above pa1ty politics. While the position of the President is similar to the 
Governor-General's role, the establishment of a Presidency with its higher 
status and greater mandate would present new challenges and issues. The 
important factors of any proposed presidential model are: 
(1) The process by which a President is appointed. 
(2) The process by which a President is removed. 
(3)The powers and duties vested in the President. 
Andrew Ladley points out that these factors are inherently 
interrelated. The process of appointment typically determines what powers 
are vested with a President. 90 The process of dismissal also reflects the 
process of appointment. 91 Because these factors are so interrelated it is 
prudent not to consider them separately. In construction of the Australian 
referendum proposal each factor was considered separately and this resulted 
in a flawed presidential model. While this division is in many ways artificial 
it is justified in that it serves to elucidate the possible roles of the President. 
The process of appointing a President is a contentious feature of any 
proposed presidential model. In the Australian referendum the process of 
appointment of the President was so divisive that it resulted in splitting the 
pro-republican vote. 92 Some commentators have argued that the 
appointment process directly effects how a president performs.
93 
A president can be appointed through a variety of ways. The 
Presidents of Iceland and Aust1ia are decided by general election, the 
90 Ladley above nl 1 78. 
91 Republican Advisory Committee nlO, 127. 
92 McKenna and Hudson above n4 225 
93 David Soloman "Parliament and Executive in a Republic" (1994) 8 Legislative Studies 
44. 
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Presidents of Germany and India are by Electoral Committee and the 
Presidents of Israel and Greece are chosen by parliamentary election. The 
appointment process typically consists of two parts, the nomination process, 
of choosing the presidential candidates, and the selection process, which 
determines which candidate will be President. In consideration of 
determining an appropriate process of appointment it is important to 
consider the functions of the president, such as ceremony, community and 
the need for impartiality. The possible options in appointing a President are: 
(1) Appointment by Prime Minister. 
(2) Appointment by Electoral College. 
(3) Appointment by Popular Election. 
(4) Appointment by election of Parliament. 
A Appointment by Prime Minister 
In his essay, Who Should be Head of State? Andrew Ladley outlines 
a minimalist republican model in which the Governor-General's powers and 
process of appointment are simply transferred to the New Zealand 
President. 94 This proposal would be the slightest departure from New 
Zealand's present constitutional arrangements. The President would be 
appointed by the Prime Minister directly rather than consultation with the 
Sovereign. 95 As in accordance with present practice, opposition parties 
would be consulted to ensure a non-partisan appointment. This process of 
appointment does not guarantee consultation with the opposition. Whilst 
opposition parties are generally consulted there have been occasions where 
the opposition was not consulted. There have been a variety of partisan 
94 
Ladley above n 9, 79. 
95 
Ladley above n 9, 79. 
appointments m relation to the Governor-General, including Sir Keith 
Holyoake, Sir Paul Reeves and Dame Catherine Tizard.
96 
In a situation where there has been no consultation the opposition 
party will have had no avenue of complaint. Nor will it have had any means 
by which it can secure government consultation in the appointment of a 
president. Since the introduction of MMP the appearance of being non-
pmtisan and above party politics is essential and it would seem that a more 
formal process requi1ing opposition consultation is needed. At present there 
is no formal obligation to consult with the opposition. The process of Prime 
Ministerial appointment does not sufficiently guarantee a non-partisan 
appointment. The appointment of a President requires a more formal 
mechanism that secures a non-partisan appointment. 
B Election by Electoral College 
Presidents are appointed by electoral college in numerous countries 
such as India, Germany and Italy. An electoral college is a body which is 
designated to elect a person to a particular office.
97 Electoral colleges were 
first conceived as a means to mitigate the public will by electing a body 
rather than holding a direct election. They are principally used in federal 
republics to obtain an electoral college which is representative of both state 
and federal legislatures. In Germany, the Federal Assembly determines who 
will be President. 98The Federal Assembly comprises an equal number of 
Federal Parliament and State Parliament ministers. 99 This composition 
gives a greater proportional influence to State Parliament. The Federal 
Assembly then elects the president with a simple maj01ity. 
New Zealand is a unitary rather than a federal state and does not 
have a strong regional government. There also seems little demand to cater 
for regional voices and local diffetences. As such, there is little need to 
96 Joseph above nl 1,659. 
97 Oxford Dictionary (2nd Edition Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986). 
98The Basic Law for Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 54 
99 The Basic Law for Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 54 
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establish a body to cater for federal or regional voices m appointing a 
President. In view of this an electoral college is not a suitable means by 
which to appointment a New Zealand President. 
C Appointment by Popular Election 
An appointment of a president by popular election has come to 
prominence post the Australian Republican Referendum. The referendum's 
negative result has been partly blamed on the general public's preference for 
a President appointed by direct election rather than by Parliament. The Right 
Honourable Jim Bolger has referred to the desirability of an elected 
President. '00 The nations of Iceland, Portugal, Austria and Ireland all 
appoint their Presidents through democratic elections. 
Appointment of a president by popular election has a number of 
advantages. It is truly democratic and involves the public directly m 
determining who will be their Head of State. This gives the position of 
president greater publicity and also gives greater gravitas to the performance 
of community and ceremonial functions. The direct election method of 
selection has the additional popular appeal in that it excludes politicians 
from the process of appointment. 101 It should be remembered, however, that 
the appointment of a president by popular election has in the past been 
dominated by former politicians. 102 
Whtlst the direct election of a president is at present the preferred 
option it is not without its critics. They argue that any general election will 
result in a president who is a political appointment and it will be dominated 
by candidates affiliated to a political party resulting in the president being 
linked to a single political party. Such c1iticism is confirmed with the 
appointments of the Presidents of Ireland and Austria who are dominated by 
'
00 Andrew P . Stockley "Becoming a Republic? Issues of Law" Luke Trainor: Republicanism in New Zealand 
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former politicians affiliated to particular political parties. As non-
partisanship is required for a President to successfully exercise his or her 
reserve powers then the possibility of a politically affiliated president could 
lead to a constitutional crisis. 
Another criticism of the electoral option is that a president elected by 
general election would believe he or she has a democratic mandate and is 
more likely to intervene in the workings of government. This argument is 
outlined by Phillip Shannon who says that: 
A president, with a popular mandate of a majority of votes, may become 
too powerful. He or she might be encouraged to attempt to enter the 
political arena in competition with the government , especially if backed 
b · . · h h 103 y a greater maJonty m voter support t an t at government 
A president with a democratic mandate would then be inclined to 
exercise his or her reserve powers and hence interfere with Parliament and 
increase the risk of constitutional crisis. It must be noted that the 
democratically elected presidents of Ireland, Austiia and Iceland have 
considerably less discretionary powers than our Governor-General to 
intervene in the workings of Parliament. So it cannot be confirmed whether 
an elected president would be more inclined to exercise his or her reserve 
powers. 
There is also a financial concern. Popular elections are considerably 
more expensive. The total amount spent in the 2005 general election was 
over three million dollars. 104 As the president only performs minimal 
constitutional duties it is questionable whether such an expense can be 
justified. The cost of the Presidential election would be considerably less if 
it was held in conjunction with a general election but this would only further 
politicise the Presidential appointment. 
103Phillip J Shannon Becoming a Republic: Law Reform Options for New Zealand 
(LLM Research Paper Victoria University of Wellington, 1995). 
104 Electoral Commission ,Annual Report (Wellington, June 2005)17 . 
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A nomination process is an essential part of any direct election of a 
president. There exists a variety of different nominee processes. In Iceland 
and Portugal a possible presidential candidate must be sponsored by a 
specific number of voters 
105 
and in Austria any candidate can nominate 
themselves . ' 06 
Ireland's electoral system is often put forward as an ideal republican 
model for New Zealand to adopt. Ireland' s nomination process is a 
particularly complex one. The Irish Constitution provides that an election 
only occurs when there are contesting presidential candidates. 107 If the 
election is not contested then the sole nominee is appointed President. There 
were no presidential elections between the period of 1973 and 1990108 The 
Irish Parliament generally attempts to avoid presidential elections, hence 
there is considerable consultation between political parties to nominate a 
candidate with wide spread non-partisan support. When the I1ish political 
patties cannot come to a consensus they each nominate competing 
candidates which results in a general election. Ireland' s candidate nominee 
process would not be a suitable choice for New Zealand to adopt for two 
reasons. Firstly the Irish system of having a parliament conspire to avoid a 
general election is not a suitably transparent mechanism. Secondly if a New 
Zealand President is to be elected then it should be at regular intervals and 
the candidate selection process should be open to all. Furthermore, this 
process results in a general election for presidency at a time when 
parliament is most divided. 
Another consideration in electing a president is what electoral 
system should be used. The presidential elections voting systems in Iceland 
105Portugal the nomination must be sponsored by non less than 7500. In Iceland the figure is 
no fewer than 1500. 
106 
There is a sinole restriction in that no one related to the Austrian Monarchy can be b 
nominated . 
107 Article 26 prescribes the process by which an Irish President is appointed . All potential Presidential 
candidates are required to be nominated. A Candidate can either be nominated by 12 members of the Lower 
Parliament or by the four county councils (or the presiding President can al so nominate him or herself.) 
108 David Gwyynn Morgan, Constitutional Law of Ireland, (The Round Hall Press , Dublin 
1985)52. 
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and Austria are elected by First Past the Post. Austtia differs from Iceland's 
in that a President elect has to receive the majority of the vote. If no single 
candidate gains a majority then the leading two candidates enter into a 
second election. 109 If there is only one presidential candidate then the 
election takes the form of a referendum confirming or refuting the candidate 
as President. In Ireland, the President is elected through the proportional 
Single Transferable Vote (STY) electoral system.' ' 0 The STY voting system 
allows voters to rank their preferences allowing a president to be appointed 
with broad general suppott. 111 The STY electoral system results in the 
selection of a president who represents the populace' s general preference 
rather than the preference of the majority as under FPP. 11 2 As the 
appearance of non-partiality is important for a President to fulfil 
constitutional functions it would appear that STY is a preferable electoral 
system. 
It is expected that a referendum will determine whether New 
Zealand becomes a republic or not and if so what form that republic will 
take. The appointment of a president through popular election has 
considerable public appeal and is a likely favourite to win in a referendum. 
Nonetheless there are substantial criticisms of appointing a president 
through a general election. An elected president with a democratic mandate 
is more likely to challenge Parliament and be more inclined to exercise the 
reserve powers. The proclivity of an elected president to exercise the reserve 
powers should be accounted for when considering what powers should be 
vested with the President. 
If New Zealand does decide to appoint a president by popular 
election then there needs to further discussion as to which election and 
candidate process should be adopted. As evidenced above there is a 
diversity of systems by which a President is elected by which New Zealand 
109 RAC Appendages, above n 75 23 . 
110RAC Appendages , above n 75, 23 . 
111 Hague and Harrop above n6 148. 
11 2 Hague and Harrop above n6 148. 
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can choose from. A preferable model for a popular election would need to 
be transparent and held at regular intervals, a requirement that would 
exclude the adoption of the Irish electoral system. The candidate process 
should not be restricted by the political parties. An open process like 
Austria's has which allows any person to be nominated would be preferable. 
The most appropriate voting system for the presidential election would be 
STY which would reflect the populace's general preference rather than the 
simple majority. 
D Election by Parliament 
A common method of appointing a president is election through 
parliament. The Presidents of Israel, Greece, Malta, and Mauritius are 
d h h I . b 1· 11 3 appointe t oug e ect10n y par iament. This system has several 
advantages . The Parliament is democratically elected and is, therefore, 
representative of the public. A president appointed by Parliament would not 
be under the impression that he or she has a mandate to exercise the reserve 
powers. It also avoids the cost of having a general election. 
A criticism of this is that an election by Parliament would simply see a 
President who is affiliated to the government appointed. The appointment of 
a partisan president who might be associated with a political party is 
avoided by the requirement of a higher threshold than a simple majority. 
Greece and Mauritius requires a presidential nominee to receive over two 
thirds majority support. 114 Such a threshold requires the Government to 
consult and acquire opposition support for a candidate to be appointed 
president. 
Some commentators have criticised a supermajority threshold arguing 
that it results in the appointment of the least contentious rather than the most 
113
Republic Advisory Committee above n6, 66. 
11 4 
The Constitution of Greece 1976 art.32 
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able. David Solomon, an Australian commentator, opposes the election by 
parliament process. He argues that: 
The danger is that the appointee will be the common denominator not the 
person most suited to the job, but the person least dangerous. He or she 
would most likely be apolitical or even ignorant of politics, never having 
publicly made a statement which offended one side of politics or the 
other .... [S]urely it would be positively dangerous to have someone so 
ignorant of politics that decisions were influenced (or even determined) by 
unelected and perhaps unknown advisor.
115 
The belief that presidential appointments by parliament will be lacking 
calibre is misplaced. Presidents appointed by parliament are no less 
educated or experienced than other appointed presidents. Most tend to be 
former politicians who are well versed in politics. 
There are a variety of different procedures for a parliamentary election 
to appoint a president. In Israel presidential candidates have to be nominated 
by 10 members of parliament. 116 The President is elected by a process of 
secret ballots where he or she has to secure an absolute majority in 
Parliament on the first two ballots. If by the second election, no presidential 
candidate has secured an absolute majority then, with each further ballot, the 
candidate with the least votes is removed until a absolute majority is 
secured. 11 7 
In contrast Greece requires that only one presidential candidate be put 
forward. The nomination of two or more candidates in the house risks 
political grandstanding and invites a political impasse regarding suitable 
candidates. 11 8 Such a single nomination with consultation would seem the 
most appropriate process for nominating a candidate. To have contested 
115 David Soloman "Parliament and Executive in a Republic" (1994) 8 Legislative Studies 
4444. 
116 Israeli Basic Law: The President of the State, 6th Tamuz, 5724 (16th June 1964) 
117 Israeli Basic Law: The President of the State, 6th Tamuz, 5724 (16th June 1964) 
11 8 Joseph above n 13, 696. 
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nominations in Parliament would risk a divisive debate which might damage 
the impartiality of the presidential nominee. 119 
The nature of how New Zealand will select its president will 
probably be determined by referendum. In deciding the referendum options 
care must be taken with the actual specifics of the process of presidential 
appointment. As is illustrated above there is a variety of different processes 
within each method of appointment. 
In summary, the preferable options for appointing a president would 
be by general election and election by Parliament. Of these options the 
election by Parliament is preferable because of the financial cost of the 
general election and also because a President elect, would have a democratic 
mandate and is more likely to conflict with Parliament. The choice will 
probably be determined by the New Zealand public. 
IV REMOVAL OF A PRESIDENT 
In evaluating the role of a president the process of dismissal is often 
disregarded. It is, though, a vital component in defining the role of a 
president. The process of dismissal, like the other factors, can not be 
considered in isolation but in the context of how the President was 
appointed and which powers are vested within. The process of removing a 
president varies greatly from one country to another. Some use a judicial 
body, others use a parliamentary process and some use a referendum. To 
remove a president in Sri Lanka it requires a supermajority in Parliament 
while in Austria a president may be removed by a referendum of recall. 
120There is a general equivalent process for appointment and removal. In 
considering how a president might be removed it is important to take 
11 9 
Joseph above n 11 , 696. 
120 
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account of the process of appointment and the powers vested within the 
position. 
The present process for the removal of the Governor-General is a 
simple recall by the Prime Minister. Such ease of dismissal can be 
problematic if the president has reciprocal powers to dismiss the Prime 
Minister. Such reciprocal powers encourages the Prime Minister or 
President to a pre-emptive sttike, in attempt to secure their own position by 
first dismissing the other. This high noon scenario is illustrated by Kerr-
Whitlam affair. Such expedient executive actions should be avoided. 
If the President 1s to act as "constitutional guardian" and have 
powers to dismiss then there should be no process of arbitrary removal. 
However, if the President is not vested with any discretionary executive 
powers then a "high noon scenario" will not arise and there is no need for a 
formal process for dismissal. 
Before a discussion of the merits of procedures for the removal of a 
President it is necessary to consider what would be suitable grounds for the 
removal of a President. The grounds for dismissal have to meet sufficient 
criteria and should be broad enough to cover situations that cover general 
mal-administration and high enough that the president can not be dismissed 
on a whim. In consideration of these factors the removal of a president could 
be compared to the removal of a High Court Judge. A High Court Judge can 
be dismissed under section 23 of the New Zealand Constitution Act, which 
provides: 
23. Protection of Judges against removal from office- A Judge of the 
High Court shall not be removed from office except by the Sovereign or the 
Governor-General, acting upon an address of the House of Representatives, 
which address may be moved only on the grounds of that Judge's 
misbehaviour or of that Judge's incapacity to discharge the functions of that 
Judge's office. 121 
121 The New Zealand Constitution Act 1996, s23. 
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In accordance with this statute the president can be dismissed if the 
misbehaviour or incapacity can be proved. This seems a sufficient threshold 
by which to dismiss a President. 
A va1iety of different processes exist for the dismissal of the President. 
These include a referendum of recall, parliament hearings and also a prime 
minister' s discretion. A referendum for recall of President, used in Iceland 
and Austria, would be an expensive and lengthy process. It is also doubtful 
whether the general populace is suitable to determine whether a president 
has 'misbehaved' or is 'incapable of discharging' his or her functions. 
The most appropriate process for removal is by Parliament. To avoid the 
dismissal of a President being decided upon partisan lines a super-threshold 
is required. A partisan dismissal could be excluded by having a 2/3 
threshold or by Parliament establishing a Parliamentary Commission of 
Inquiry to determine an alleged misconduct. 
In regard to dismissal , George Winterton has argued that to properly 
restrain a president, the exercise of the reserve powers should result in the 
resident ' s dismissal. 122Winterton uses the analogy of a bee-sting, which 
results in the death of the bee when it stings. Whilst this would dissuade a 
president from exercising the reserve powers the possible simultaneous 
dismissal of both the President and the Prime Minister would lead to a 
constitutional crisis. As both the Prime Minster and Governor-General 
would be dismissed the question exists as to who would appoint the others 
successor. The dismissal of a president for the exercise of a reserve power 
appears to cause more problems than it solves. 
In summary, if the President is to retain the reserve powers then 
dismissal by prime ministerial demand must be removed. Instead, a formal 
process should be introduced. The most appropriate process is removal by 
122 w· 6 interton, n88,2 2. 
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vote of parliament following a parliamentary inquiry into whether the 
President is guilty of misconduct. 
VI THE POWERS OF A NEW ZEALAND PRESIDENT 
The Head of a State in a parliamentary democracy as opposed to a 
presidential republic is vested with minimal executive powers. However, these 
discretionary powers are still considerable as their use can determine who will 
be appointed or dismissed as Prime Minister and whether Parliament should 
be dissolved. As such these Presidential powers still need to be carefully 
considered and defined. 
In considering what powers should be vested with the President, it is 
important to consider how the president will be appointed and possibly 
dismissed. As George Winterton states: 
The reserve powers appropriate to a republican head of state cannot be 
determined in abstract. Since much will depend upon the features of the 
Office, above all the method of selection. 123 
Therefore the manner of how a President is appointed and also 
dismissed should be considered in regard to what powers a President should 
have. The powers of a president should not be defined separately but in 
regard to other aspects of the office. 
While it is tempting to simply transfer the reserve powers to a New 
Zealand President it is important realise that the role of the Governor 
General are subtly different. There are several factors which will increase a 
president's independence and status A president will be the actual Head of 
State as opposed to a mere representative also unlike the Governor-General, 
a President, would not feel constrained by a need to protect the monarchy. 
This is more likely to give the President "greater status and self 
123 Winterton above n88 , 258. 
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assurance" 
124 
Such independence and higher status will increase the 
proclivity of a president to exercise the reserve powers. This mandate of the 
president will increase exponentially if he or she is directly elected. Such a 
democratic mandate would require that a president be restrained, so as not to 
exercise his or her reserve powers excessively. As Angela Macdonald in her 
paper, Restraining a President, highlights that a president directly elected is 
more likely to misuse the reserve powers and hence require have to reserve 
powers have to be restrained. 125If a President is to be directly elected then 
there is a need to restrain them from misusing the reserve powers. This 
raises the question of, how should a president be restrained? 
There are four options as to what constitutional powers should be vested 
with a New Zealand President: These are to: 
(1) Retain the Reserve Powers. 
(2) Retain the Reserve Powers accompanied with clarifying resolution . 
(3) Codify the Reserve Powers. 
(4) Divest the Reserve Powers to Parliament. 
A Retaining the Present Reserve Powers 
In establishing a President, the most minimal reform would be to 
simply transfer the present reserve powers. The constitutional powers of a 
Governor-General could be transfeITed without difficulty by substituting the 
position of President in place of the Governor-General in the pertinent 
statute and standing orders. While the constitutional powers of the 
Governor-General can easily be transfened the conventions which restrict 
their exercise may not. With a transition to a Republic "the present 
conventions governing the exercise of the reserve powers might not 
124 
Winterton above n88, 258 
125 
Macdonald above n 96, 14. 
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subsist," 126 The present conventions might be perceived as relating to the 
Monarchy and not a President. In establishing a Republic the present 
constitutional an-angement of specifying the powers of the Governor-
General, and relying on the conventions to restrict their exercise can not 
continue. Instead the conventions must be explicitly sited and transfen-ed in 
a provision which would require that the President exercise his or her 
powers in accordance with the constitutional conventions that governed the 
Governor-General. South Africa adopted such a provision in its Constitution 
of 1961 (this has since been repealed): The Constitution of South Africa 
1961, s7(5) provided that: 
The Constitutional conventions which existed immediately prior to the 
commencement of this Act shall not be affected by the provision of this 
Act.1 27 
A more suitable provision (because it allows for the possibility of further 
development of the conventions) was drafted by G Winterton: It provides 
that: 
The Head of the State shall exercise his or her powers and perform his or 
her functions in accordance with the constitution conventions which 
related to the exercise of the powers and performance of the functions of 
the Governor-General, but nothing in this section shall have the effect of 
converting constitutional developments into laws or of preventing the 
further developments of these conventions. 128 
This provision makes it explicit that the president is to act on the advice of 
the responsible minister and hence clarified the role of the president. 
Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir Gerard Brennan believes even 
this statutory transference will result in the reserve powers becoming 
126 Winterton above n88, 254. 
127The Constitution of South Africa 1961, s7(5) 
128 Republican Advisory Commission, above n6, 94. 
45 
he 
:nt 
)r-
10t 
m 
1er 
:he 
on 
1ca 
1er 
ies 
: of 
ven 
mg 
45 
judiciable
129 
This would render the exercise of the reserve powers review-
able by the Courts, who could then be asked to determine a political issue, 
for which they are ill equipped to do. George Winterton believes that the 
problem of judiciablity can be avoided by a proposed provision specifying 
that the section is non-judiciable. 130 
However, retaining the present reserve powers will also retain the 
current criticisms of them. The reserve powers, as shown by Professor 
Quentin Baxter are presently too ambiguous and are in need of definition. 131 
The President' s misuse of the reserve powers will not be attached to any 
sanction or possibility of review. Also in the case of an elected President, 
due to possible stronger mandate and greater politicisation, the need for 
reform is even more pressing. Retaining the reserve powers will not 
sufficiently restrain an elected president. 
2 Formulation of Written Conventions 
Professor Quentin Baxter proposes to clarify the reserve powers by 
Parliament passing a resolution which would provide an authoritative 
statement on the reserve powers. This authoritative statement would serve to 
clarify and educate a president on what his or her reserve powers would be. 
Such a resolution has the benefit of clarifying the reserve powers but avoids 
the problems of rende1ing them judicially reviewable. The resolution could 
also be amended as the convention further develops. 
The Republic Advisory Committee believes there is difficulty in 
formulating a statement which is inclusive of the perceptions of the reserve 
powers. They give the example of the Australian Advisory Committee on 
Executive Government which since 1975 has endeavoured to formulate 
f l · 132 agreed conventions. It has yet to reach consensus on a ormu at10n. 
129 Sir Gerard Brennan "Reserve Powers in a Republican Constitution" (2004) 7 Const Law 
and Policy Review 3, 51 . 
130 
Winterton above n88, 254. 
131 
Republican Advisory Commission above n6, 95 
132 
Republican Advisory Committee above n6, 95 . 
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It is questionable whether a resolution is sufficient to restrain a 
president from misusing the reserve powers. A president may breach the 
terms of the resolution and would be no sanction. To what extent a President 
should be restrained depends on the nature of presidential influence and 
independence. A clarifying resolution is unsuitable when a president has a 
greater mandate and is required to be restrained. A clarifying resolution, 
while sufficient to elucidate the reserve powers , cannot restrain a president 
from their misuse. If the president is elected then a clarifying resolution is 
not a sufficient restraint on his or her powers. 
2 Codifications of the Reserve Powers 
The codification of the reserve powers has long been debated. 
Codification has been argued as a means to clarify the vagueness and 
uncertainty of the reserve powers. It has been proposed as a means to 
provide certainty. Dr Evatt in his book on The King and his Dominion 
Governors has argued for the codification of the conventions, so as to 
provide a "definite constitutional rules enforceable if necessary, by the 
ordinary courts of law." Such codification would provide certainty in 
defining the reserve powers. Evatt agreed that codifying the reserve powers 
would be difficult as there would be a loss of flexibility but he believed that 
there was a "greater danger in leaving things how they are." 133 
Although many commentators advocate codification there are also 
many opposing such reform. Those opposing codification believe that the 
reserve powers are unable to be effectively codified because such 
codification would only serve to belittle the reserve powers. Lord Radclife, 
in reference to codifying the reserve powers, held that "some conventions 
133 
H Evatt, The King and His Dominion Governors (Frank Cass London, 1967), 120. 
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are too shapeless or diffuse to codify." 134 An attempt to codify a convention 
with such a diffuse nature will only result in the codification being either too 
technical or an overly broad definition. 
A mere general statement, Dr Eugene Forsey argues, would be worse 
than useless. 
135 
A broad definition of the reserve powers would fail to 
clarify and define, "leaving the whole field of argument open." 136 A general 
definition of the reserve powers would fail to adequately restrain a president 
giving him or her wide discretion. 
In contrast an overly detailed approach to codifying the reserve 
powers would result in a rigid and inflexible definition. As Sir Robert 
Garrant states: "To try to crystallise this fluid system into a hard and fast 
code of written law would spoil its chief merit: we must be careful to lay 
down only the essential principles of popular government, leaving the 
details of form as elastic as possible." 137 A rigid definition though would not 
be able to account for all political situations and those that fall outside the 
rules would result in uncertainty and would render the rules unworkable. 
Hence the two approaches to codifying the reserve powers are inherently 
problematic 
However the Republican Advisory Committee, in considering these 
challenges, have proposed a new approach called partial codification which 
they refer to as a 'middle ground' approach. It is a compromise between a 
broad and an overly detailed definition. Partial codification attempts to 
codify only the reserve powers which are generally agreed upon, leaving the 
contested conventions unresolved. The Republican Advisory Committee has 
proposed that the president be only granted such powers where it is: 
134 Abeghenro v Akintola[l963] AC 614 (PC). 
135 H.V. Evatt, E. A. Forsey Evatt and Forsey on the reserve powers (Legal Books, Sydney 
l 990)xxxiii 
136E 128 .. . vatt and Forsey, above n , xxx111. 
131 c · · E · Advisory Committee to the Constitutional omm1ss10n xec11t1ve 
Govemment(Commonwealth Publishing, Canbera, June 1987) 14. 
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"absolutely necessary to preserve the rule of Jaw and protect the operation of 
b . " 138 Th . 1 responsible government from abuse y the executive. e partia 
approach seems to overcome the codifying difficulties of generality and 
rigidity. Partial codification has been criticised by Angela Macdonald who 
purports that it fails to codify the powers to act as a constitutional guardian. 
She further states that this Jack of codification leaves too much discretionary 
power in the hands of the President. She states that a: "[P]resident should 
not retain such sweeping personal discretion to subvert the democratic 
process by referring only to his judgement."
139 
There is nothing inherent in a partial codification approach which 
states that the powers of a Governor General, as a constitution guardian, can 
not be codified. This would seem to be a simple oversight by the Republican 
Advisory Committee not to include the codification of these powers. Angela 
Macdonald proposes that the President must consult a Judiciary in the 
exercise of these reserve powers. 140 Such powers with a duty to consult the 
Judiciary in its exercise could be codified with little difficulty. 
By codifying the reserve powers they will become judicially 
reviewable. As the reserve powers relate to Government and the House of 
Parliament. To make this reviewable would be contrary to the principle as 
stated by Blackstone who wrote " that whatever matter arises concerning 
either the House of Parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and 
adjudged in that House to which it relates and not elsewhere." 141 
Some have argued, as Justice Garfield Barwick does, that Judges are 
unsuitable and ill-equipped to make political decisions. Judges are though 
called on to make political decisions, from time to time. The political 
repercussions of the Courts will be immense and should be discouraged. A 
suitable process would be to obligate the President to consult with the 
138 Winterton above n 88, 256. 
139 MacDonald above n36 49. 
140 MacDonald above n36 49. 
141 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (17 th ed, 1830) vol 1, 
163 Winterton above n 88, 255. 
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Supreme Court in the exercise of his or her reserve powers. This approach 
is suggested by Angela MacDonald and the Republican Advisory 
Committee. 142 
While there are inherent difficulties with codification it is certainly 
preferable than allowing the reserve powers to be undefined. There is a great 
need for urgency considering that an elected president is more likely to be 
partisan and will have a greater public mandate. In regard to a 
democratically elected president the codification of the powers seems the 
suitable option. 
D Divesting the Powers to Parliament 
In considering what powers a president should have it is important to 
ask whether there should be any powers vested with the position at all. The 
parliament democracies of Europe have predominantly divested their 
presidents of all reserve powers. The Head of States of Japan and Sweden 
have no discretionary constitutional powers, while the Presidents of Austria, 
Ireland, Germany, Italy and Israel only have residual reserve powers. 
In such European constitutions the reserve powers have been 
divested from the President and entrusted within Parliament. In contrast to 
Commonwealth countries, European constitutions do not perceive the Head 
of State as a constitutional guardian, and hence do not impart the position 
with powers to dismiss Prime Ministers or Government. Europe has, instead, 
preferred to vest such powers in parliament as a representative of the people 
as it is believed to be a suitable organ to determine such powers. Their 
constitutions essentially adopt a more democratic perspective, entrusting 
critical political decisions to parliament, believing that parliament is cable of 
resolving political crisis. 143 
In European count1ies the Prime Minister is usually appointed by the 
Legislature through a vote of investiture. There are two forms of investiture 
142 
Macdonald above n 96, 14. 
143 
Winterton above n88, 255. 
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vote, a positive and a negative investiture vote. Germany has a positive 
investiture vote, where to take office a Government must obtain a majority 
support in parliament. Sweden has a negative investiture where a 
government takes office unless voted down by the majority vote. 
144
1n 
Sweden the Speaker of the House acts as a formature, facilitating the 
f . f G 14s 01matwn o a overnment. 
In European parliamentary republics, a Prime Minster or 
Government can be dismissed if parliament passes a motion of no-
confidence. In the German constitution it specifies that there can only be a 
constructive vote of no confidence. A constructive vote of no confidence 
requires that a Chancellor's government can only be brought down if 
assembly has selected a Chancellor to replace the incumbent. The purpose 
of a constructive no confidence vote is to prevent legislatures from acting 
destructively without thought to its successor. 146
 Germany also restricts the 
Prime Minister (Chancellor) from dissolving Parliament and seeking a new 
election. The Chancellor can only dissolve Parliament and seek new 
elections if the Chancellor has lost a vote of confidence. 
147 Such rules are 
designed to ensure Government longevity and stability. 
Should New Zealand, having adopted Ge1many's electoral system, 
also adopt its rules for forming and dismissing Government? The adoption 
of such a system would have certain advantages. Such a system would free 
the President of having to be concerned with the formation and dismissal of 
government, allowing the President to focus on performing his or her 
ceremonial and community functions. The exercise of the reserve powers in 
the formation of, or the dismissal of a Government has, political 
repercussions which can tarnish the position. 
Divesting the reserve powers away from the President will rid the 
position of the role of constitutional guardian. As New Zealand has no 
144 Hague and Harrop above n 8, 276. 
145 Hague and Harrop above n 8, 276. 
146 Hogue and Harrop above n 8, 278. 
147 Hogue and Harrop above n 8, 278. 
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supreme Bill of Rights by which a Court can strike down unconstitutional 
laws or executive decisions, the role of a Head of State as a constitutional 
backstop is a vital part of our constitution. 
Divesting the President of any reverse powers will not only rid the 
constitution of its constitutional guardian but will rid the Parliament of an 
adjudicator. The President will have no power to intervene in Parliament if 
there is a political impasse which has resulted in legislative gridlock. It is 
questionable whether the New Zealand Parliament is responsible enough to 
manage itself without ending in deadlock. 
In New Zealand there could be dangers in applying the 
representative electoral system of MMP which determines the make up of 
the House, but then does not adopt the regulations which regulate the 
German Parliament. Whether New Zealand Parliament will be unstable due 
to the lack of these rules can only be made clear with time and after further 
observation. 
E The Royal Prerogative 
In New Zealand, becoming a republic an important issue is how the 
royal prerogative will be affected by the deposing of the Monarchy. New 
Zealand, as a former colony, inherited the royal prerogative from the United 
Kingdom. These prerogative powers include: powers over foreign affairs, 
the power to declare war and make peace, the ability to conduct inquiries 
and enter into contracts, 148 the appointment of Ministers and the proroguing 
Parliament. 149 
The removal of the Monarch will also remove the common law basis 
of the Crown prerogative. The removal of the royal prerogative would 
148 G Winter, Parliament the Executive and the Governor General, Melbourne University 
Press, 1986) 6. 
149 Phillip Joseph Constitutional and Administration Law in New Zealand (4'
h 
ed, 
Wellington, Brookers, 2004) 22 
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det1imentally affect the effective working of government and hence should 
be preserved. 
There are two proposed methods by which the royal prerogatives can 
be preserved. Firstly, the prerogatives could be codified to vest in the 
executive of the republic. However all attempts to define the prerogatives of 
the Crown have only very met with only limited success. An attempt to 
precisely define the prerogatives only serves "to limit their flexibility and 
adaptability." 150 
The second way to preserve the prerogative powers would be to 
simply transfer the prerogative powers to the new head of state. Such a 
provision can be found in the Irish Constitution. The Irish Constitution 
article 49 provides: 
All powers, functions rights and prerogatives whatsoever exercisable 
m or in respect of Saorstat Eireann immediately before the 11th day of 
December, 1936, whether in virtue of the Constitution then in force or 
otherwise by the authority in which executive power of Saorastat was then 
vested are hereby declared to belong to the people. 151 This provision would 
preserve the prerogative without the problem of definition. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The establishment of a New Zealand republic is considered by many 
commentators to be inevitable. It is a belief that is confirmed by the growing 
support of the general public for a republic. However, as Angela MacDonald 
has pointed out, New Zealand's jurisprudence on becoming republic is 
150 Angela Jane MacDonald Constraining A President- A Republican Challenge for 
Australia and New Zealand (LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington) 2005 
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"fledgling and republican scholarship is limited." 152 Presently constitutional 
debate has focused on possible obstacles and the procedural requirements of 
establishing a republic. The purported constitutional barriers, under closer 
observation , are found not to have substance. This paper concludes that 
there is no constitutional barrier which prevents New Zealand from 
becoming a Republic. 
If New Zealand is to make the constitutional jump to become a 
republic then there needs to be considerable public discussion about what 
type of republican constitution it would prefer. This is not simply a moral 
imperative but also a legal one. For the Judiciary to accept any constitutional 
reform it will have to determine the 'will of the people.' Certainly the best 
way to promote debate and to ascertain the will of the people is to hold a 
national referendum. 
In the consideration of these options set out m a republican 
referendum the role of the future president needs to be carefully considered. 
This essay stresses the interdependence between the aspects of a presidential 
role. The manner of appointment, dismal and the powers vested with in the 
President are interconnected in ways that on first impression are not obvious. 
The legislator who will define the role of a New Zealand president should 
refrain from considering factors separately, believing they options are 
simply interchangeable. The faults of such an abstract approach can be seen 
in Australian referendum proposal. 
Therefore in consideration of the role of New Zealand president it is 
necessary to consider all factors; the process of the appointment, the process 
of dismissal and what powers that should vested with the President. Given 
the popularity of a system where a president is appointed by general election 
it would seem highly likely that a New Zealand will have a President 
appointed by a general election. A president-elect would have a considerable 
democratic mandate and would most probably be politically affiliated. There 
152 Macdonald above n 96, 14. 
54 
is , therefore, a great urgency to restrain him or her from the misusing the 
reserve powers. Such misuse can only be prevented if the reserve powers are 
codified, paitial codified 
The adoption of a republic will not be a fundamental change to New 
Zealand 's form of government. It will , though, be a constitutional change 
and for this reason great care needs to be taken. Establishing a republic will 
grant New Zealand a New Zealand Head of State; it would seem prudent, 
therefore, that the New Zealand public choose what role that President has. 
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